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Abstract 
Social bots mimic and potentially manipulate humans and their behaviours in social networks. 
The public sphere might be especially vulnerable to their impacts, which is why we first discuss 
their potential influence on the public sphere from a theoretical perspective. From an empirical 
perspective, we analysed Twitter followers of seven German parties before (N = 638,674) and 
during the 2017 electoral campaigns (N = 838,026) regarding bot prevalence and activities. The 
results revealed that the share of social bots increased from 7.1% before to 9.9% during the 
election campaigns. The percentage of active social bots remained roughly the same. An 
analysis of the content distributed by both the most popular and the most active bots showed 
that they disseminate few political hashtags, and that almost none referred to German politics. 
We discuss the results against the background of normative traditions of public sphere theories 
and address the methodological challenges bots pose in political communication. 
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1. Introduction 
Social bots are computer programs that mimic and potentially manipulate humans and their 
behaviours in social networks (Ferrara, Varol, Davis, Menczer, & Flammini, 2016; Wagner, 
Mitter, Körner, & Strohmaier, 2012). Bots post in online forums and dating platforms, and 
‘like’, comment, and share social media contributions. They are cheap tools to make content, 
topics, or actors appear more popular than they really are. They start and catalyse online 
phenomena to stir outrage and artificial hypes, while neither people nor trending algorithms can 
discern them with full accuracy as non-human agents. Social bots differ from more general bot 
software that deliver simple services around information retrieval, selection or the creation of 
personalised preferences without directly interacting with Internet users (Woolley, 2016).  
Social bots are no longer a marginal phenomenon on social media platforms. On Twitter, 9% 
to 15% of users are estimated to be bots (Varol, Ferrara, Davis, Menczer, & Flammini, 2017). 
There has been an exponential growth in the number of Twitter bots on the largest open-source 
online code repository, GitHub – which enables people with few programming skills to deploy 
social bots for their (political) purposes (Kollanyi, 2016). Their everyday occurrence makes 
analysis and reflection imperative from a social science perspective, and calls for a convergence 
of social and computational science approaches. How do social bots influence and change social 
and political discourses that are invisible and indiscernible to Internet users? Do social bots 
endanger and challenge the interactive and participatory potential of digital communication in 
mass democracies? How should studies assess empirical evidence of social bots’ prevalence, 
activities and impacts, and what does this mean for studies on political communication in social 
media generally?  
From the perspective of political communication, we address social bots from three angles: 
theoretical, empirical and methodological. We begin with a review of the theory and current 
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literature regarding social bots, to discuss how they work and why they may create problems 
for democratic processes and public communication, drawing on public sphere theories. We 
then present an empirical study of social bots among Twitter followers of Germany’s political 
parties before and during the country’s 2017 national election campaigns. From a 
methodological perspective, our paper raises the question how political communication 
scholars who work with social media data should deal with social bots.  
 
2. Theory: Social bots, agency and normative models of the public sphere 
From a theoretical perspective, social bots challenge many concepts that social scientists take 
for granted, for instance, the question what constitutes an actor. While some authors understand 
bots as “automated social actors” (Abokhodair, Yoo & McDonald, 2015, p. 2), the question of 
technology and non-human agency is theoretically more complex. Technologies designed and 
programmed by humans embody social values and business models; they are encoded with 
human intentions and have limited agency of their own (Klinger & Svensson, 2018). Their 
behaviour is human-like and human-guided, which makes them human-dependent rather than 
autonomous actors. For instance, people overcome their physical limitations by using bots to 
retweet messages under multiple personas. Social bots impact communal relationship types 
(Vergemeinschaftung), i.e. social relationships based on a sense of belonging together, as well 
as associative relationships (Vergesellschaftung), i.e. social relationships based on rational 
agreements (Weber, 1922, §9). How do we account for social structures and relations that 
include social machines? And, since we know that social bots generate a large percentage of 
Internet traffic (Zeifman, 2015) and interact with human users, what does this mean for the 
formation of social relations and society, especially the public sphere? 
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On the one hand, there are many useful tasks for social bots in political communication. Similar 
to bots helping people to choose new outfits, bots could help citizens identify their political 
preferences and match them with parties and candidates (e.g. in voting advice applications, such 
as Wahl-O-mat in Germany or Smartvote in Switzerland). On the other hand, problems start 
when bots operate in disguise, interacting with citizens, voters, and stakeholders without people 
knowing. Social bots can orchestrate campaigns to hype organisations, alter perceptions of 
political reality by spreading propaganda (Abokhodair et al., 2015; Boshmaf, Muslukhov, 
Beznosov & Ripeanu, 2011), disrupt government and organisational communication (Woolley 
& Howard, 2016), feign grassroots movements (Rathnayake & Buente, 2017), spread 
misinformation (Shao, Ciampaglia, Varol, Yang, Flammini, & Menczer, 2018), and alter public 
opinion by simulating the popularity of or protest against topics or actors (Ferrara et al., 2016). 
This implies that an increasing amount of online communication is non-authentic, but at the 
same time intended to yield real consequences.  
Social bots can have different functions based on the behaviours they are programmed for. They 
can be merely passive, connecting with a number of accounts in order to boost the number of 
followers and their interconnectedness without contributing content. In this way, they make 
actors appear more popular and socially acceptable than they really are, encouraging others to 
follow or ‘like’ them (the so-called bandwagon effect, Sundar, Oeldorf-Hirsch, & Xu, 2008). 
Alternatively, they could be active, liking, sharing, retweeting, commenting and broadcasting 
information, interacting in debates and fuelling discussions.  
Online public spheres, such as social media platforms and online forums, have become 
commonplace for deliberation, political talk, discourse, and the articulation and aggregation of 
political interests. Whether or not participants realise it, their interactions are likely to be 
infiltrated by social bots and their agendas; as Mitter, Wagner, & Strohmaier (2013, p. 1) put 
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it: “Without a deep understanding of the impact of such attacks, the potential of online social 
networks as an instrument for facilitating discourse or democratic processes is in jeopardy.” 
However, whether social bots pose a threat to the public sphere or democracy largely depends 
on the normative perspective. Table 1 describes Ferree, Gamson, Gerhards, & Rucht’s (2002) 
four models of the public sphere in modern democracies: representative-liberal, participatory-
liberal, discursive and constructionist. 
Here: Table 1 
 
In a representative-liberal tradition, the public sphere is an elite-dominated, free and transparent 
forum that enables citizens to repeatedly choose (and replace) their representatives. In this 
instance, bots potentially disturb the key principles of proportionality and transparency. By 
discreetly making some ideas and actors appear more popular than they really are, coverage of 
political actors becomes disproportional to their de facto citizen following. Although citizens 
may be unaware of the situation, it becomes impossible for them to take popularity cues (Keller 
& Kleinen-von Königslöw, in press; Porten-Cheé, Haßler, Jost, Eilders & Maurer, 2017) from 
political actors in social networks as a proxy of public opinion and their popularity among 
fellow citizens, and there may even be a conflict of popularity cues online (likes, retweets) and 
offline (polls, media coverage). Thus, in a representative-liberal perspective, bots are a problem 
when they distort political competition, intervene in campaigns, and influence elections’ 
outcomes. If bots boost political parties or candidates’ number of Twitter followers, Facebook 
friends or group members, they threaten the functioning of key democratic processes. 
In a participatory-liberal tradition, the public sphere is a space for public discourse that seeks 
to achieve maximum popular inclusion – not only during election campaigns, but all the time. 
Voices should not be linked to proportionality, but to plurality: all interests and actors in a 
community should be included and heard. However, with increasing bot presence, the desired 
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inclusion of grassroots movements may turn more to astroturfing,  “grassroots support that is 
artificial because it is manufactured and does not arise spontaneously” (Klotz, 2007, p. 5). The 
principle of plurality is based on the premise of authentic interests and stakes in a society. Bots 
may insert non-authentic interests (interests no human or group in a society have ever voiced) 
and manipulated interests (fake interests that are manufactured to distort plurality). It becomes 
impossible for a society to monitor itself when machines disguised as societal members enter 
and manipulate the marketplace of ideas (Alexander, 2015). This means that bots are not only 
a problem because they lead to quantitative misrepresentations and make parties or candidates 
seem more popular than they are, but because they could potentially give voice to non-existent 
ideas. In the functioning of public spheres, this is particularly relevant when bots send and 
multiply (retweet) political messages. 
This aspect becomes even more toxic in the discursive tradition: “But when important 
normative questions are at stake, it is crucial that the discussion not be limited to actors at the 
centre of the political system. On such issues, a well-functioning public sphere should 
simultaneously include actors from the periphery as well [...]” (Ferree et al., 2002, p. 300). 
Habermas’s distinction between autonomous (autochtone) and power-regulated (vermachtete) 
actors from the periphery becomes obsolete when automated, manipulative and interest-driven 
bots enter a discourse. Bots have no intention to understand or consider others’ opinions, and 
their participation in political discourse only emphasises their creators’ lack of respect for 
deliberative processes. The idea that decisions are made collectively, and conflicts are resolved 
based on an argument’s quality rather than on the number of supporters for an argument, is 
irreconcilable with social bots. With bots, discourse becomes impossible; debate turns into a 
travesty. 
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Finally, a constructionist perspective on public spheres focuses not only on plurality and 
inclusion, but on difference and mutual recognition: “Recognition politics, sometimes called 
identity politics, creates a good public sphere by decentring dominant speakers and their 
assumptions of what is ‘natural’” (Ferree et al., 2002, p. 308). In this tradition, everything is 
political, whether it takes place in private or in public, wherever power structures appear. The 
normative objective is to give voice to the marginalised, contesting and breaking “the 
boundaries between the public and private” (p. 311). This notion of public conversation and 
democratic processes is seen as particularly vulnerable to the participation of bots, because it 
seeks to empower previously silent voices and to include fringe groups and their political 
claims, and prefers narrative styles over rational, unemotional debate. Bots can boost popularity 
cues and take on the identity of an assumed marginalised group (Howard, Wooley & Calo 
2018). Constructionist visions of public discourse depend on authentic individuals contributing 
genuine perspectives from their life-worlds (Lebenswelt), which are easily infiltrated and 
undermined by bots. 
Bots are not inherently evil forces, and they are not all problematic for the same reasons. Any 
assessment of their impacts must acknowledge their empirical behaviour patterns and a 
theoretical reflection on normative assumptions about political communication and the public 
sphere. 
 
3. Literature review: What we know about social bots in political communication 
While these questions are being discussed in blogs and newspapers, communication research is 
only starting to focus on social bots. Initial social science research projects have made it clear 
that social bots are by no means a merely technical phenomenon, but change how Internet users 
interact and form social relations among each other, and with institutions, organisations and 
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society. Social scientists have only recently begun to address their potential to intervene in 
election campaigns and to distort public communication and deliberation (Hegelich & Janetzko, 
2016; Woolley, 2016). 
Social bots exist to participate in human interaction and discourse, and are finding a fertile 
habitat in social media networks. Approximately one-quarter of Donald Trump’s Twitter 
followers during the 2016 U.S. presidential campaign were bots (Woolley & Howard, 2016b). 
By focusing on hashtags, Kollanyi, Howard and Woolley (2016) found that bots made up a 
large part of Twitter traffic during the campaign and privileged Trump messages over Clinton 
ones. Bessi and Ferrara (2016) found that social bots were present and did influence the U.S. 
presidential campaign, with about 20% bots involved, generating about 20% of the political 
debate on Twitter. They also showed how easy it is to employ bots, even for inexperienced and 
non-tech-savvy users, since they are offered by diverse companies, sometimes even on a 
monthly subscription basis (p. 2). Bots intervened in the Brexit debate (Howard & Kollanyi, 
2016), and the online petition for a second referendum on Brexit in June 2016 was “signed” by 
77,000 bots (BBC, 2016). Bastos and Mercea (2017) discovered a network of 13,493 
Twitterbots supporting the Leave EU campaign. Social bots drove the #MacronLeaks 
disinformation campaign: “the users who engaged with MacronLeaks are mostly foreigners 
with a pre-existing interest in alt-right topics and alternative news media, rather than French 
users with diverse political views. Concluding, anomalous account usage patterns suggest the 
possible existence of a black-market for reusable political disinformation bots” (Ferrara, 2017, 
p. 1). A study of Germany’s 2017 election campaigns at the Oxford Internet Institute found that 
“highly automated” tweeting increased from 5.7% to 7.4% between February and September 
2017. It also compared data from other projects but with the same research design, finding 
between 5.2% and 16.5% automated tweeting in various campaigns (Neudert, Kollanyi & 
10  
Howard, 2017). Previous studies outside the U.S. and European contexts found that right-wing 
parties and radical opposition parties used social bots more often than other parties (Schäfer et 
al., 2017). Hegelich and Janetzko (2016) identified and analysed a botnet connected to the 
Ukraine conflict and showed that social bots have political agendas and act relatively 
autonomously on the basis of complex algorithms.  
This is all the more relevant because experimental studies show that users perceive social bots 
as equally credible, competent, attractive and interactive as human agents (Edwards, Edwards, 
Spence & Shelton, 2014; Everett, Nurse & Erola, 2016). In this perspective, social bots can be 
understood as new actors in digital political communication and a key element of what has been 
termed computational propaganda: “We define computational propaganda as the assemblage 
of social media platforms, autonomous agents, and big data tasked with the manipulation of 
public opinion” (Woolley & Howard, 2016a). 
From previous empirical studies on social bots, we can conclude that bots are omnipresent on 
platforms, particularly on Twitter, and that they are being used to influence political and other 
debates. This case study of how social bots interfere with the digital public sphere focuses on 
Germany’s 2017 national elections seeks to answer five research questions detailed below.  
Previous studies found that between 5% and 25% of Twitter accounts are bots (Bessi & Ferrara, 
2016; Neudert et al., 2017; Varol et al., 2017) and that the number of bots is higher during a 
campaign phase than in a non-electoral period, especially since bots are sometimes removed 
from a platform after a campaign (Bastos & Mercea, 2017). Based on this, we ask: 
RQ1: How many social bots follow Twitter accounts of German parties? 
RQ2: Are there more social bots during the election campaign than in the non-electoral period? 
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While passive social bots among a party’s followers may increase their popularity, active bots’ 
functionalities are more sophisticated. They are able to ‘like’ or retweet parties’ messages, 
making them appear more popular and spreading them through the network. During election 
campaigns, the incentives to use bots to increase a party’s visibility and to impact on political 
debate are higher, both for a party’s supporters or other actors with an interest in influencing an 
election (Ferrara, 2017). 
RQ3: Are there more active social bots during the election campaign than in the non-electoral 
period? 
 
All but one political party in Germany have pledged to not strategically use social bots during 
their campaigns, after social bots became a topic of public debate. One party, the right-wing 
populist AfD (Alternative for Germany) declared in October 2016 that “of course” they would 
implement social bots in the election campaign – “after all, for young parties such as ours social 
media tools are important instruments to proliferate our positions among voters”1 
(Stürzenhofecker, 2016, p. 1). A few days later, the party retracted this statement with a 
declaration not to use bots in the campaign. However, since similar right-wing populist parties 
in Japan and France used bots (Ferrara, 2017; Schäfer et al., 2017), and Neudert et al. (2017) 
found that most bots were supporting AfD, we ask: 
RQ4: Does the right-wing populist party AfD have the largest share of social bots among its 
followers? 
 
                                                        1 Original quote: “Gerade für junge Parteien wie unsere sind Social-Media-Tools wichtige Instrumente, um unsere Positionen unter den Wählern zu verbreiten.”   
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Most studies measuring bots during election campaigns have remained silent on the content 
disseminated by bots (Zhang & Lu, 2016). Bots’ presence alone is regarded as problematic. 
Nonetheless, it is possible that the same bots that boost parties and candidates’ popularity levels 
spread no political messages, only commercial advertisements (Maireder, Weeks, Gil de 
Zúñiga, & Schlögl, 2016) or even nonsensical content (Bucher, 2017). We investigate whether 
bots post political content, and if they do it more often during an election period than in a non-
electoral period. 
RQ5: Do social bots disseminate political content, and if so, more during the election campaign 
than in the non-electoral period? 
 
A final aspect in this literature review addresses the methodological approaches of bot-detection 
in studies. Bots avoid detection, and their creators invest effort into their resembling human 
users. Thus, it is not easy to identify bots and to distinguish these Twitter accounts from human 
accounts. Zhang and Lu’s (2016) computational approach used a user’s network information to 
determine whether an account is a bot or a human on Weibo. Thus, they identified “millions of 
spammers” (Zhang & Lu, 2016, p. 14). The downside of their strategy is that they can only 
identify spambots depending on someone’s network. Another approach, that of Hegelich and 
Janetzko (2016), is based on the URL that a tweet was sent from, which can be retrieved as part 
of a tweet’s metadata. By manually identifying tweets sent from obvious bot creators, such as 
Twifarm, they searched for accounts that followed these bots in order to unveil bot-networks. 
This approach is only possible if one starts with hashtags and tweets, not with Twitter accounts, 
because account metadata contains no URL information. The downside is that this method only 
detects a small number of active bots. For instance, in Hegelich and Janetzko’s case study, only 
1,740 bots followed one another. Another approach is to identify and single out behavioural 
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aspects that differ from human users, such as a high frequency of messages sent. Various studies 
on campaigns (Howard & Kollanyi, 2016; Neudert et al., 2017) came from a group of scholars 
who count any account that sends out more than 50 tweets per day as bot, assuming “high 
automation”. Needless to say, it is possible for a person to send 50 tweets per day (Musgrave, 
2017). Also, not all bot accounts are this active, since passive bots exist only to boost certain 
accounts’ follower numbers. Thus, this approach can only capture a specific bot type that 
broadcasts very actively. There is also the strategy of detecting social bots via near-duplicate 
tweets (copies or very similar versions of the same tweet sent by multiple bots), which bots use 
to inflate certain topics’ frequency and importance (Schäfer, Evert & Heinrich, 2017). While 
this detection method is very useful, it remains unclear whether humans copied and pasted a 
tweet’s content (Musgrave, 2017). Even if these copy-and-paste users were bots, they discover 
only one type of active copy-bots. Another share of studies uses multiple indicators to detect 
social bots: More elaborate ones use indicators such as “tweets to user”, “mean tweet to 
retweet”, “common words in the username” or “ratio of outbound to inbound @-mentions” 
(Bastos & Mercea, 2017, p. 6) to capture more than simple automated accounts. A similar 
approach, by Guo and Chen (2014), with a focus on geotagged tweets, proposes four steps to 
identify spambots, including machine learning techniques. A drawback is the focus on 
geotagged tweets, because many Twitter users opt out of this option. Although very elaborate, 
these techniques are hardly reproducible, since they require programming skills, which many 
social scientists (like us) lack.  
With any bot-detection method, scholars face two key problems: 1) the cat-and-mouse game 
between bot creators and bot-detection developers and 2) the limited availability of data from 
commercial platforms. With complete datasets, it should be easy for platform owners to detect 
bots, but the incentive to do this and to delete these accounts is perhaps not worth pursuing: bot 
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accounts do not buy anything and have no value for advertisers, but they keep the user numbers 
high. A sudden drop in platform users may unsettle shareholders. Thus, scholars must make the 
best of a tough situation. Here, we use the bot-detection tool Botometer, which was developed 
and maintained by computer scientists; it checks more than 1,000 variables of an account for 
features that are typical for bots (Davis, Varol, Ferrara, Flammini, & Menczer, 2016). This tool 
has been used in previous studies and is currently the most sophisticated, reliable and available 
instrument for bot-detection (see the next section on methods). Botometer is open for other 
scholars to detect social bots on Twitter so as to replicate our analysis. 
 
4. Data and methods  
We collected data on all Twitter accounts that followed the five German parties represented in 
parliament: conservative CDU and CSU, social-democrat SPD, socialist Die Linke, and 
environmentalist Die Gruenen. We also studied the liberal FDP, and right-wing populist AfD, 
which were considered likely to successfully (re-)enter Germany’s Parliament in 2017 (and 
did). There were two data collection waves: the first, before campaigns started in January and 
February 2017, and the second during the week before Election Day on 24 September 2017. 
For both waves, we first downloaded the Twitter account data of all followers of the seven 
German parties, including metadata such as their Twitter ID, screen name and numbers of 
followers, following and tweets (via BirdSong Analytics). Metadata also included information 
on account activity, i.e. whether or not a follower had been active in the past three months – 
that is, whether he or she tweeted, retweeted, liked or replied to a tweet. Downloading took 
place between 1 January and 13 February 2017 for the non-election period (1.180.362 
accounts), and from 12 to 14 September 2017 for the campaign period (1.588.213 accounts).  
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In the second step, we used Botometer to identify bots and distinguish them from humans in an 
automated analysis via Botometer’s API (Python 3.5). Since social bots constantly change their 
appearance, they are complicated to detect (Thieltges, Schmidt, & Hegelich, 2016). Botometer 
is a publicly available bot-detection instrument created and maintained by computer scientists 
at the University of Indiana. At the time of our study, it was the most sophisticated available 
instrument and has been used in several academic research projects, both by the creators and 
other scholars (Bessi & Ferrara, 2016; Ferrara, 2017). To ensure quality and comparability 
between the two waves, we kept in close contact with the computer scientists who maintain 
Botometer (and are greatly indebted to them for their kind support). However, we need to stress 
that bot detection is not an exact science, and Botometer also comes with serious limitations 
that we detail below. 
Botometer “generates more than 1,000 features using available metadata and information 
extracted from interaction patterns and content” (Davis et al., 2016, p. 2). These are grouped 
into six main classes, (Varol et al., 2017): user features include the number of followers and 
tweets produced by users; friends encompasses follower-friend relations such as retweeting and 
mentioning behaviours between one another; network characteristics include in-strength and 
out-strength (weighted degree) distributions, density and clustering; content and language 
features include statistics about length and entropy of tweets and part-of-speech tagging; 
sentiment features encompass arousal, valence and dominance, happiness, polarisation, strength 
and emoticon scores (see Varol et al., 2017). From these, Botometer calculates a probability 
score between 0 (human) and 1 (bot) for each Twitter account. Overall, the tool has an accuracy 
of 0.86 and suggests that 9% to 15% of all Twitter users are bots (Varol et al., 2017). Because 
the tool is better equipped to identify humans than bots, our threshold for bots should be fairly 
high – not all accounts with a probability score over 0.5 should be counted as bots.  
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We conducted step three, data manipulation and cleansing, in R (R Core Team, 2017). 
Botometer could only evaluate about half of the Twitter accounts: 54% of followers in the non-
electoral period (N = 638,674) and 53% of followers in the campaign period (N = 838,026), 
which constituted our sample (see Tables 2 and 3). Three errors prevented Botometer from 
calculating a final score for the remaining 541,688 follower accounts in the non-electoral and 
750,187 accounts in the campaign phase: (1) an empty timeline (478,954 / 667,477 accounts), 
(2) the deletion of a Twitter account in the days between data collection and data analysis (1,269 
/ 2,135), and (3) privacy settings not authorising access to run an analysis (61,465 / 80,575). 
This points to a serious limitation of Botometer. While social media platforms monitor their 
users’ behavior and remove suspicious accounts such as social bots (Lorenz 2018), external bot 
detection tools struggle with the platform’s API access and its corresponding restrictions. 
Botometer cannot include a user’s past activity in its analysis (when a user deletes all previous 
activity, Botometer cannot calculate a score). Additionally, Botometer’s access is limited by 
the user’s privacy settings (bots may hide behind the veil of strict privacy settings). This leaves 
us with a specific kind of accounts: Twitter accounts with weak privacy settings, which were 
not deleted between data retrieval and the completion of analysis, with at least one tweet, 
retweet or like. However, it should be underlined that all current bot detection tools and methods 
are imperfect. Despite these limitations, Botometer is a not-for-profit, academic project that has 
been and is widely used (e.g. by the PEW Institute), publishes about how it works and is based 
on a multitude of possible indicators – which makes it a viable tool for the purpose of this study. 
 
Here: Table 2 
Here: Table 3 
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To allow direct comparability between the different number of party followers and the metric 
scale scores, we calculated probability density functions (PDF), which we present as density 
plots. To answer RQ1 to RQ5, we set the threshold for detecting bots depending on the density 
plots and accuracy of Botometer.  
For a content analysis of messages that bots disseminated (RQ5), we selected the 100 most 
active bots (number of tweets sent) and the 100 most popular bots (number of followers). Both 
vary significantly from the general bot population and represent the peak of the long-tail 
distribution of bots’ activity and popularity: While the 100 most active bots sent on average 
94,920/113,200 tweets (non-electoral/election period), the average of all bots was 171/120 
tweets. The 100 most popular bots had an average of 45,950/81,520 followers, whereas the 
average of all bots was 106/90 followers. With this focus we investigate two very specific types 
of bots: the most popular bots, which could potentially function as opinion leaders reaching a 
large number of Twitter users and the most active, which could potentially flood the 
twittersphere with political content. After having downloaded their tweets for the extended non-
electoral period between 2 January and 2 April 2017 (N(active) = 60,262, N(popular) = 42,425), and 
the extended campaign period between 24 June and 24 September 2017 (N(active) = 36,804, 
N(popular) = 14,130), we extracted all hashtags used in these posts to assess the overall topics of 
these tweets (Bruns & Burgess, 2015; Small, 2011). The 100 most used hashtags for both the 
most active and most popular bots in both periods were manually coded by the authors. We 
analysed 400 hashtags to assess whether they were political (e.g. #Brexit), and checked the 
tweets containing the hashtag for verification. The pre-test of 50 hashtags showed good 
reliability of the coders with a Krippendorff’s alpha of 0.87. 
 
5. Results  
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We compared the distribution of scores between 0 (human) and 1 (bot) across the seven German 
parties’ followers. We found three different patterns in the non-electoral period; while in the 
campaign period, all parties except the right-wing populist AfD show a similar pattern (see 
Figure 1 and Figure 2).  
During the non-electoral period, CDU, CSU and FDP had a similar score distribution, as did 
SPD, Linke and Gruene; AfD showed a unique pattern. In the election phase, the general score 
distribution moved to the right, indicating a tendency of more bots among party followers. This 
is also true for AfD, whose follower distribution changed only marginally between the non-
electoral and the campaign periods, although they gained more followers in the time between 
the two waves (+27,389 followers, +57%).  
The strongest differences could be found regarding accounts that are most likely bots,  followers 
with scores above 0.75. In the non-electoral period, SPD, Linke and Gruene showed a peak 
around 0.75, all other parties expressed a smaller peak between 0.85 and 1. During the campaign 
period, this peak between 0.85 and 1 was more pronounced for all parties. Notably, the 
probability density function pattern during the campaign period was very similar for all parties, 
except AfD. One reason for this, we discovered, is that most parties share followers. While AfD 
had about 45% single-party followers (followers that only follow AfD but no other party), the 
average share of single-party followers among all other parties was 17%. This means that 
approximately 83% of Twitter users in our data (whether human or bot) followed multiple 
parties. The share of single-party followers decreased slightly from February to September (-
2%), so during the campaigns, more followers chose to also follow other parties. This also 
indicates that a surplus of followers does not necessarily mean that more people follow parties 
on Twitter, but that people who already follow a party also follow other parties. Among the 
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407,851 new followers the parties acquired between February and September, only 79,272 
(19%) were single-party followers. 
 
Here: Figure 1 
 
Here: Figure 2 
 
 
Considering Botometer’s accuracy, the hard task to distinguish between humans and bots in 
general, and the distribution of the scores in our two waves, we set the threshold for bots at a 
score of 0.76. We found that the share of social bots fall mostly in the expected range of 5% to 
25% (RQ1) (see Table 4).  
Comparing the two waves, almost all parties had more followers, and most parties had more 
social bots among their followers in the campaign period than in the non-electoral period: AfD 
gained 0.4% more bots, Gruene 4.2%, Die Linke 8.3% and SPD 8.2%. Some parties had fewer 
bots during the campaign period: CDU -0.3% bots, CSU -0.8% and FDP -0.2%. Overall, the 
mean share of social bots among the seven German parties’ followers rose from 7.1% to 9.9% 
(11,105 to 23,373 social bots), but not for all parties (RQ2). 
Of these social bots, 212 (2%) on average per party were active during the non-electoral period 
and 314 (1.4%) during the campaign period. The numbers for each party are reported in Table 
4. Social bots were not more active during the campaign period (RQ3). 
Regarding RQ4, whether the populist party AfD had the highest number of social bots among 
its followers, our analysis revealed that during the campaign, AfD actually had the smallest 
share of bots among its followers (7.1%, 5,325 social bots). In the non-electoral period, AfD 
had a below-average share of social bots (6.7%, 3,181). However, AfD bots were particularly 
active: AfD had the second highest share of active social bots, with 2.8% during the non-
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electoral period and 1.7% during the campaign period. The data suggests that AfD had a larger 
share of human scores than all the other parties (scores lower than 0.4), a much higher share of 
active followers (33%/26% compared to an average of 15%/14.5% for the other parties), and 
the highest share of active humans. 
 
Here: Table 4 
 
Finally, we analysed the content of the tweets from social bots in the non-electoral and the 
campaign periods. Of the 100 most frequent hashtags distributed by social bots following a 
German party in the non-electoral period, the popular bots used 13 political hashtags (the 
frequency of a hashtag’s use ranged from 34 to 2,375, median = 71.5) and the most active bots 
30 (the frequency ranged from 30 to 1965, median = 65.5). With one exception, these political 
hashtags did not refer to German politics. They covered issues concerning politics in Austria, 
the EU (without a focus on Germany), France, Great Britain, Nigeria and the U.S. The one 
exception was one very popular bot that distributed the hashtag #AfD to promote its political 
agenda, with a total of 53 tweets. Most non-political hashtags and tweets were advertisments 
(ads for jobs, paintings, financial investments, etc.).  
During the campaign period, the use of political hashtags decreased. Of the 100 hashtags 
analysed for each set, the most popular bots used only seven political hashtags (the frequency 
ranged from 12 to 2,263, median = 23), the most active bots only eight (the frequency ranged 
from 42 to 1,916, median = 73.5). Again, none of the political hashtags referred to German 
politics; most concerned U.S. finance and climate change politics (such as #MisesInstituteUSA, 
#DavidStockmansContraCorner, #environment, #green, #climatechange). Fewer hashtags 
related to Nigerian politics (#Biafra). Similar to the non-electoral period, most hashtags had a 
promotional purpose (#yoga, #realestate, #porn, #software, etc.) in the campaign period.  
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Regarding RQ5, neither the most popular nor the most active bots tweeted more political 
content during the election campaign than during the non-electoral period. However, we need 
to be cautious and cannot generalize from the 400 most active and most popular bots, because 
they are not representative for the overall bot population. It may well be possible that bots did 
not include one of the 400 most used hashtags in their political tweets or that they actively 
disseminated electoral propaganda without following a political party and would therefore not 
be included in our data. 
 
6. Discussion  
Social bots in the digital public sphere pose at least three challenges for political communication 
research: theoretical challenges to established concepts of social science, empirical challenges 
of detection and the measurement of impacts, and methodological challenges to the general 
validity of popularity cues and social media analysis.  
In summary, we analysed Twitter follower accounts of seven German parties before and during 
the 2017 electoral campaign. The analysis confirmed previous studies by showing that the share 
of social bots among these parties’ Twitter followers increased from 7.1% before to 9.9% during 
the election campaigns. Three research questions resulted in findings diverging from previous 
studies: the share of active social bots did not increase during the election campaigns; AfD did 
not have more bot-followers than the other parties – on the contrary, it had the smallest share. 
The bots that we identified distributed almost no hashtags connected to German politics. These 
findings have significant implications.  
Connecting our findings to Ferree et al.’s (2002) four normative models of the public sphere, 
the potential damage caused by social bots in election campaigns covers a spectrum of 
problems. From a representative-liberal perspective, the results show that bots caused a 
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quantitative misrepresentation of popularity, because roughly 10% of Twitter followers were 
bots disguised as humans. In particular, in the case of SPD and Linke, the share of bots among 
followers increased by more than 8% during the campaigns. Thus, their follower growth of 22% 
each appears bigger than it really was if we only accept humans as authentic followers. Thus, 
social bots did manipulate popularity cues, disturbing the principles of proportionality and 
transparency during the campaigns. However, their impact remains purely in numbers, because 
we found hardly any political content spread by bots that related to the election. From a 
participatory-liberal and discursive perspective, it is interesting that the share of bots increased 
during election campaigns. In this tradition, the focus is much less on elections than on popular 
inclusion and authentic debate with genuine contributions at all times. The share of active bots 
(bots that like, share, comment and discuss) was very low: 2% and less in both waves. While 
the proponents of participatory-liberal and discursive understandings of public spheres would 
not exculpate bots as non-authentic participants in political debate, the low bot activity and their 
predominant distribution of non-political content would certainly be a consolation for them. 
From a constructionist perspective, the low bot activity is a greater reason for concern. Seeing 
it as crucial to include previously silent, marginalised voices in public discourse, the presence 
of software actors deliberately designed to manipulate popularity cues or contributions totally 
undermines the notion of a public sphere, whether during an election campaign or at any other 
time, whether or not they are active.  
Another interesting, perhaps peculiar pattern that begs for theoretical reflection relates to right-
wing populist AfD. In line with current literature pointing to the rather thin empirical evidence 
for echo chambers (Dubois & Blank, 2018; Fletcher & Nielsen, 2017), the increase of multi-
party followers in the electoral period indicates that echo chambers are indeed rather unlikely 
in the broader population of Twitter followers of German political parties in general. It rather 
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seems that people who already follow one or more parties on Twitter, tend to expand their 
following to more parties during the campaigns. Thus, to some extent, the parties in our sample 
share the same followers, and the number of followers increases in the second wave, because 
followers follow more parties during the campaigns than before. AfD, however, varies 
significantly from this pattern: AfD has by far the largest share of active followers (about twice 
as many as the other parties) as well as by far the highest share of single-party followers (45%, 
so about half of the AfD followers follow AfD only). Also, bots among AfD followers were 
particularly active. This can be read as an indicator that echo chambers are more likely to be 
found among AfD followers, may they be bots or humans. AfD followers seem to be much less 
interested in other political parties and to a much stronger degree form networks of like-
mindedness. 
From our descriptive data on bot presence and activity we cannot judge whether they caused 
any actual harm to the campaigns and the electoral process. We should also not forget about 
human actors who actively manipulate public discourse on Twitter. Other reports on the same 
election, that focused on other data (hashtags), found that “traffic about the far-right Alternative 
für Deutschland (AfD) accounts for a surprisingly large portion of Twitter activity given that 
party’s share of voter support” (Neudert, Kollyani & Howard 2017: 1). What we can say for 
sure is that bots were clearly present, and their omnipresence on social media platforms, 
combined with their role in other campaigns, should keep social media researchers alert, 
providing a sound reason to closely monitor their activities. 
Methodologically, social bots challenge the validity of social media studies: if a large part of 
likes, tweets, shares and comments originates from bots, how can results from quantitative 
studies measuring political actors’ interactivity and popularity on social media be validated? 
The findings show that even the increase in followers needs further differentiation: Are new 
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followers really ‘new’? Are they even persons? We propose that a standardised test for bot 
activity should become part of empirical studies about political communication on social media, 
in order to ensure results’ validity. To address this challenge, social scientists must cooperate 
with computer scientists and push for more and better tools to monitor bot activity on social 
media platforms. This also entails a more critical stance towards the validity of data from social 
networks – a key question for research quality, and not only in political communication. When 
large numbers of interactions on social media platforms are generated by bots, this must be 
reflected in the results and conclusions of studies based on this data type, for instance, network 
analyses of political actors or analyses of campaign communication on social media platforms. 
As with all single-case studies, this analysis has limitations. We examined only one election 
campaign, in one country, on one platform, with one bot detection tool. Future studies should 
compare various countries and compare their findings with different bot detection tools. One 
could also start with hashtags instead of follower accounts. Analysing hashtags would by 
default include exclusively active accounts that actually tweet, so that Botometer should 
perform better in such a design. Bot-detection is neither 100% accurate nor could it, in our 
study, deliver scores for about half of the accounts in our dataset. Building social bots that 
mimic human behaviour and building tools to identify them is a cat-and-mouse game. There is 
uncertainty about the accurate identification of bots; followers with a score around 0.6 remain 
hard to classify. The grey area is even larger when including Twitter accounts that produced an 
error: almost 89% of them had never sent a tweet (“no timeline error”). Is the sole purpose of 
these dead accounts or bots to make parties appear more popular than they really are? How 
many of them sent tweets but removed them before we could analyse the account? How many 
of them did not follow any political party but tweeted in favour of them? How many of the 
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accounts with strict privacy settings, which we were not authorised to analyse, were bots 
actively tweeting?  
Clearly, we need more empirical research into bots, their activities and impacts. Future studies 
should ask how Internet users make sense of and construct perceptions of reality from their 
online interactions. How much do they know about social bots’ presence and activity? Are they 
aware that they are interacting with social bots? Do they recall instances of interaction with 
bots? What are their perceptions of and opinions about social bots? Because people know what 
they know and what to think about from mass media (Luhmann, 2000), scholars should also 
analyse how journalists cover social bots. Are bots on media agendas? How is coverage about 
bots framed (as a technological phenomenon or a social issue)? Finally, researchers must remain 
alert to social bots and their influences on established theoretical concepts, digital empirical 
data and current methods when analysing digital communication. 
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Table 1: Normative traditions of public spheres 
 
 Inclusion  
Processes 
 
Key bot problems 
 
Representative-liberal Elites, Experts 
Recurring exchange of political 
elites in elections 
Quantitative misrepresentation of 
popularity 
Participatory-liberal Popular inclusion Plural decision-making 
Diffusion of fake political interests 
(astroturfing) 
Discursive Popular inclusion Deliberation 
Non-authentic, manufactured 
participants; Lack of mutual respect 
and rationality 
Constructionist Popular inclusion 
Empowerment of marginalized 
actors, Expansion of political 
community 
Non-authentic, manufactured 
participants 
 
Note. Overview of the models of public sphere is based on Ferree et al. (2002: 316). 
 
 
Table 2: Data of the non-electoral period (January to February 2017) 
 Number of 
Followers 
(total) 
Final data  Error 
(Sum) 
Error: 
No Timeline 
Error: 
Page does 
not exist 
anymore 
Error: 
Not 
authorized 
AfD 47.534 31.885 15.649 11.946 12 3.691 
CDU 161.025 88.207 72.818 61.766 796 10.256 
CSU 123.324 60.795 62.529 56.607 36 5.886 
FDP 148.311 75.470 72.841 66.119 33 6.689 
GRUENE 290.679 160.152 130.527 115.769 144 14.614 
LINKE 155.599 86.447 69.152 61.324 57 7.771 
SPD 253.890 135.718 118.172 105.423 191 12.558 
Sum 1.180.362 638.674 541.688 478.954 1.269 61.465 
 
 
Table 3: Data of the campaign period (September 2017) 
 Number of 
Followers 
(total) 
Final data  Error 
(Sum) 
Error: 
No Timeline 
Error: 
Page does 
not exist 
anymore 
Error: 
Not 
authorized 
AfD 74.923 44.912 30.011 24.541 228 5.242 
CDU 221.114 118.446 102.668 89.469 306 12.893 
CSU 166.631 81.389 85.242 76.875 221 8.146 
FDP 244.624 119.124 125.500 114.340 337 10.823 
GRUENE 356.481 192.472 164.009 146.104 358 17.547 
LINKE 200.089 110.578 89.511 78.956 332 10.223 
SPD 324.351 171.105 153.246 137.192 353 15.701 
Sum 1.588.213 838.026 750.187 667.477 2135 80.575 
Figure 1: All followers’ probability of being a bot in the non-election phase in a density plot 
(January and February 2017) 
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Note. Density plot of all seven German parties’ followers and their Botometer scores in the non-election 
phase. N = 638.674, bandwidth = ndr0 (see Silverman, 1986). The area between two scores and the 
function = the probability of a follower receiving such a score. 
 
 
Figure 2: All followers’ probability of being a bot in the campaign period in a density plot 
(September 2017) 
 
 
Note. Probability density function (PDF) of all seven parties’ followers and their Botometer scores in 
the election phase. N = 838.026, bandwidth = ndr0 (see Silverman, 1986). The area between two scores 
and the function = the probability of a follower receiving such a score. 
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Table 4. Bot presence and activity on Twitter in the non-electoral and campaign periods of 
Germany’s 2017 national election 
 
 
 
Non-Electoral Period Campaign period 
 Social bots among 
followers 
(%) 
Active bots 
among  
social bots 
(%) 
Social bots  
among  
followers 
(%) 
Active bots 
among  
social bots 
(%) 
AfD 3.181 (6,7 %) 88 (2,8 %) 5.325 (7,1 %) 90 (1,7 %) 
CDU 16.419 (10,2 %) 399 (2,4 %) 21.981 (9,9 %) 363 (1,7 %) 
CSU 13.759 (11,2 %) 253 (1,8 %) 17.238 (10,4 %) 236 (1,4%) 
FDP 16.180 (10,9 %) 287 (1,8 %) 26.087 (10,7 %) 338 (1,3 %) 
GRU 19.287  (6,6 %) 196 (1,0 %) 38.549 (10,8 %) 485 (1,3 %) 
LIN 1.696 (1,1 %) 9 (0,5 %) 18.734 (9,4 %) 243 (1,3 %) 
SPD 7.212 (2,8 %) 267 (3,7 %) 35.697 (11 %) 445 (1,3 %) 
Mean 11.105 (7,1 %) 212 (2 %) 23.373 (9,9 %) 314 (1,4 %) 
 
